Abstract Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a "blinding effect" on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.
Introduction
Trust is an important determinant of economic performance both on national (Fukuyama 1995) and organizational levels (Bachmann and Zaheer 2006; Gambetta 1988; Kramer and Tyler 1996) . In their daily work, members of organizations need to trust others and to reciprocate trust shown to them. On the other side, co-workers also frequently compete with each other for promotions and bonuses. For example, so called "up or out" rules are highly prevalent within professional service firms. Stirring intense competition among co-workers, these rules stipulate that best performing employees are promoted while their worse performing peers are required to leave the company (Kumra and Vinnicombe 2008). Moreover, many of the Fortune 500 companies such as General Electric, Cisco, Intel, and Hewlett Packard, among others, link parts of managers' individual benefits to relative performance (Boyle 2001) . Similarly, parts of CEOs' compensations are often explicitly tied to how well they perform relative to their peers (Murphy 1998) .
What are the effects of competition on trust and trustworthiness among individuals? Previous studies have shown that competitive reward structures which induce direct competition between partners in a work relationship decrease the level of trust between them (e.g., Ferrin and Dirks 2003; Tjosvold 1982 Tjosvold , 1985 . In contrast to existing literature, in this paper we suggest and experimentally test the idea that competition induced by tournament incentives not only affects trust between direct competitors, but also modifies the relationship between individuals who do not compete against each other. For example, a manager remunerated in comparison to the performance of managers in other divisions will have different trust relationships with her subordinates than a manager whose remuneration does not depend on how her performance compares to others. Similarly, relationships of business consultants and corporate lawyers with their clients will be influenced by intense competition for promotions and bonuses in their respective companies.
Although in the previous examples no competition exists between contestants and third parties, trust between them might still be crucial for their performance. A manager who can rely on and is in turn trusted by her subordinates is likely to perform better than if such trust is absent. The same is true for consultants or corporate lawyers who maintain reciprocal trust relationships with their clients. Supporting evidence for this idea comes from Dirks and Ferrin (2001) who, in a meta-analysis of previous empirical results, suggested that an individual's trust relationships within and outside the organization can have a considerable impact on her job performance. Following this line of reasoning, in this paper we focus on trust relationships between two individuals who do not compete against each other, but yet might contribute to each other's success by showing trust and acting reciprocally when trusted.
Prior research on competitive reward structures has not paid attention to the indirect effects of competition on such third party relationships. In practice, however, members of organizations are likely to interact just as much with third parties like clients, subordinates or co-workers from other divisions of the company as with their peers against whom they are ranked. It is intuitive that direct competition between individuals has a negative effect on trust and trustworthiness. By contrast, the effect of competitive incentives on trust relationships with third parties is less obvious. We
